论公司瑕疵设立制度

王胜宇


　　所谓公司瑕疵设立，是指经公司登记机关核准登记并获营业执照而宣告成立的公司，在设立过程中，存在不符合公司法规定的条件和程序而设立公司的情形。它使公司成立后在法律上处于一种有别于正常公司的地位与状态。从理论上讲，既然法律明确规定公司设立必须符合特定的条件与程序，公司设立瑕疵本应该导致公司设立无效，并且自始否认其法律人格的存在。然而，这种消极的做法，使既已存在的公司的法人资格简单地消灭，往往会对第三人、股东及公司员工等利益相关者造成毁灭性的影响，并造成资源的极大浪费、对交易安全与社会经济秩序的严重破坏。这无疑是一个不容忽视的经济与社会问题。可见法律如何对待这类公司涉及诸多法律关系的稳定，为了解决这类问题，许多国家的公司法都规定了公司瑕疵设立制度。但是，不同国家的公司法对公司瑕疵设立制度的规定存在着较大差异，至少可以有下面三种： 　　（一）瑕疵设立有效。这种制度以英国、美国为代表，是指公司注册机关所颁发的设立证书具有推定《公司法》有关注册的所有要求均已得到遵守的确定性证据功能。依此，一旦公司获得设立证书，则即便公司在设立过程中存在违反公司法规定的瑕疵，没有特殊情况也就不能以此质疑甚至否定公司设立的效力，所有依法注册设立的公司皆为合法公司。　
　　应该说这种瑕疵设立有效制度很好地体现了民法中公示公信原则，一个公司公告成立，领取并悬挂营业执照，这种行为无疑是在向社会公示该公司已经合法设立、依法拥有法人人格，而我们知道法律行为一经公示，便会产生相应的公信力。第三人正是基于对这种公示的信赖，才与之发生法律关系，比如债权债务关系、买卖合同关系；即便公示有瑕疵，我们也不能依此来否定公司的设立有效，否则将会威胁与公司有利害关系的人的利益，尤其是增加市场交易的成本，如果我们在和公司交易时都不再相信公示而要亲自调查它是否成立有效的话，无疑会大大增加交易的成本，当然也是不可能的。英美法系国家之所以会采取瑕疵设立有效的模式，也正是考虑到效率原则，通过对瑕疵设立的承认，来减少企业设立成本和交易成本。他们知道一个“活着的”公司的价值远远大于一个“死掉的”公司这个道理。　
　　（二）瑕疵设立无效。一些大陆法系国家如德国、日本等采取这种做法。在这些国家，即便公司已经获得设立证书，但如果公司在设立过程中存在违反公司法关于设立条件与程序的规定，经股东或其他利害关系人提起无效诉讼，公司将被宣告无效，且公司自设立开始时起即不具备法律效力。然而，这种绝对否定既已设立公司的法律人格的立法态度，对交易安全及社会经济秩序构成了严重破坏。譬如，在一些案件中，被告以原告公司在行为时因存在设立瑕疵而缺乏法人格为由进行抗辩；而在另一些以公司为被告的案件中，被告则以其行为时尚未依法成立为由进行抗辩，从而实现推卸责任的目的。　
然而，当一个公司被宣布无效后，到底会产生怎样的法律后果呢？是转换成合伙性质的企业，还是公司被被迫进行清算，从而避免遭受进一步的财产损失？我想这个不应该一概而论，需要根据不同情况加以规定（三）瑕疵设立可行政撤销。这种制度是说，当公司设立存在瑕疵时，可有行政机关予以撤销。我
　　国新《公司法》第199条规定：“违反本法规定，虚报注册资本、提交虚假材料或者采取其他欺骗手段隐瞒重要事实取得公司登记的，由公司登记机关责令改正，对虚假注册资本的公司，处以虚报注册资本金额百分之五以上百分之十五以下的罚款；对提交虚假材料或者采取其他欺诈手段隐瞒重要事实的公司，处以五万元以上五十万元以下的罚款；情节严重的，撤销公司登记或者吊销营业执照。”由此可见我国采取的是瑕疵设立可行政撤销制度。　
　　但是新《公司法》仍未就瑕疵设立公司的人格问题或是公司设立瑕疵的法律后果作出较为完善的规定，这既有害于债权人的交易安全，也未能给予股东、董事等利害关系人权益的必要保护。我认为，我国公司立法有必要对此作出明确的规定，且我国关于公司设立瑕疵的法律后果，应当至少区分以下几种情形设计合理的瑕疵设立制度：　
　　（一）实际出资达到了法定最低资本额而未达到应缴资本额的情形。在我国，为维护市场交易的安全，保障债权人的权利能够实现，规定在公司设立时，必须在公司章程中明确规定公司资本总额，并一次性发放、全部认足或募足，否则公司不得成立。这就是公司法中的法定资本制，但是请注意，法定资本制度的主要特点是资本或股份的一次发放，而不是一次缴纳股款。 所以，新《公司法》不再要求公司必须一次缴纳股款，而可以采用分期缴纳股款的方式。那么如果在规定的年限内，公司仍没有缴足股款的应该如何处理呢？难道就因为它的资本不足，就可以根据公司法对公司设立的要求宣布它的设立无效，否定它的法人人格？这和宣布一个没有钱的人不是“人”又有什么不同呢。如果我们仅仅因为一个公司的实际资本没有达到其章程所规定的资本额（达到了法定最低资本额）就去否定它的设立有效，这显然有悖于市场交易的效率原则，不利于保护与公司有利害关系的人的利益，最终也有损于公司债权人的利益。毕竟一个“活着的”公司的价值永远是大于一个“死去的”公司的。而且我国《公司法》第31条和第94条规定了公司的股东或发起人负有“资本充实责任”，尽管资本充实责任主要是针对非货币财产出资，但这种理念我觉得是完全可以转接到公司瑕疵设立制度中的。当实际出资达到了法定最低资本额而未达到应缴资本额时，就责令负有交付义务的股东或发起人缴足出资，其他股东或发起人承担连带责任。只有在仍不缴足股款的情况下，我以为才可以否定公司的法人人格，但是仅仅是让公司变为“合伙”而已，而不应该对公司进行“清算”。还是因为一个“活着的”企业的价值永远是大于一个“死去的”企业的，何况这类公司成立之初已经是满足了法定的最低出资额的，也就是说这类公司还是拥有一定的还债能力的，对债权人利益的威胁还没有强到需要牺牲公司、不顾市场效率和成本来保护他们的利益。　
　　对于实际出资未达到应缴资本额，同时未达到了法定最低资本额的情形。根据企业维持的原则，还是应该首先责令其缴足股本并且其他股东或发起人承担连带责任；只有当其拒不缴足或是实在无力缴足时，才能否定它的设立有效。不过这时应该对其进行清算以保护债权人的利益，而不是认定为合伙。尽管企业的价值是大于清算的价值的，但是当企业连法定的最低注册资本额都无力缴足时，我们很难相信它的还债能力，在平衡企业利益与债权人利益时，我们应该侧重保护债权人的利益。　
　　（二）出资比例结构不符合公司法规定的情形。我国新《公司法》第27条规定：“全体股东的货币出资金额不得低于有限责任公司注册资本的百分之三十”。之所以会这样规定是为了保证公司资产结构的合理性和公司正常经营活动的需要，保证公司资产应有的流通性和变现性，保证公司对外负责的有效清偿能力。然而公司法就公司并没有满足这一要求而成立的法律后果的问题并没有作出任何规定。显然根据我们不能否定这类公司的法人人格，新《公司法》第199条也只是对几类严重的的情节，允许公司登记机关撤销公司登记或者吊销营业执照。那么处理这种瑕疵设立的公司，我们能不能像处理实际出资达到了法定最低资本额而未达到应缴资本额的公司一样处理呢？我想，在法理上存在一定难度。如果责令公司改变资金的比例结构，公司不外乎两种选择：一是减资，减少非货币的出资；二是增资，增加货币的出资。但无论是哪种方式都涉及到资本不变原则和公司自治原则的问题，即法律在确立了资本不变原则后，公司需要增资或者减资的都必须严格按照法定程序进行。新《公司法》对公司增资、减资的事由和具体方式也作出了具体规定，并要求公司召开股东会或股东大会且经代表三分之二表决权的股东通过方可生效。如果行政部门责令公司改变出资比例，势必会引起一系列法律上的问题；更复杂的是，如果公司选择减资的方式，还会牵连到公司实际出资未达到应缴资本额的情况。　
　　要解决处理这类瑕疵设立的公司的问题，就要先搞清我们限定出资比例的目的是什么，我们有没有必要限定出资比例。限定出资比例起初的目的是为了保证公司资产结构的合理性和公司正常经营活动的需要，保证公司资产应有的流通性和变现性，保证公司对外负责的有效清偿能力。但是随着社会的不断发展，金融体系的不断完善，我们发现有不少公司起初都是没有太多自己的现金，而通过抵押贷款发展壮大起来的；还有不少人即便是有钱也会向银行或是他人借款来投资创业。这也正是经济学、投资学所推崇的方式：用别人的钱去赚更多 的钱。可见，现代公司对于自有现金的依赖正在减弱，怎样的货币出资比例叫做合理也应根据不同的公司情况加以考虑。我以为，法律不应该对此太多干涉，只要该货币出资比例能够使公司有发展，那就是合理的。对于出资比例的调整实应该交由市场经济规则去调整。所以，对于这类公司，我主张行政部门应该采取放任主义，不予干涉。　
　　（三）有无民事能力或限制民事能力担任股东的情形。我国法律要求公司设立发起人须具备完全民事能力，无行为能力人和限制行为能力人参与公司设立受到限制。法律所禁止的不可设立公司的自然人，当然不可以成为公司的股东。 如果发起人在公司设立过程中死亡，其“股份”被其幼子继承，或发起人失去行为能力，公司随后设立成功，这类瑕疵设立的行为的法律后果应该是怎样的呢？有学者认为应该认定继承无效，并由其他股东以合理的价格收购。他们认为发起人设立公司是基于相互间的信任关系，所以公司的设立行为具有一定的人生性。可是他们忘记了，一般情况下，公司的股份作为一项财产其价值远远大于出卖它所获得的收益。不给与其继承人继承股份的权利，这种行为本身就是对已死亡或失去行为能力的股东利益的侵害，与社会伦理道德也相违背。一个与社会伦理道德的规则是不能成为法律的，与其说私法是制定出来的，更确切地说私法是被“发现”的，它来源于业已形成的社会道德和习惯。对于这类公司，我们也不能认定其设立无效，否则便有客观定罪的嫌疑，有损社会效率和成本，损害其他有利害关系的人的利益。只要为无行为能力人或限制行为能力的股东设定一位代理人即可。　
　　（四）有公务员担任股东的情形。我国《公务员法》规定，公务员不得从事从事或者参与营利性活动，不得在企业或者其他营利性组织中兼任职务。因此公务员自然也就自然不能成为公司的股东。起初设立这一规则是担心公务员利用职务之便为公司谋取非法利益，但是问题却在于究竟他有没有这样的权利来谋取不法利益。对于这类瑕疵设立我以为应当区分对待两种情况：　
　　（1）若是该公务员所任职务有条件、有可能为公司谋利，不论该公务员是否利用职务为公司谋利，应当责令公务员出售股权或股份，对于公司则应保留其法人人格。　
　　（2）若是该公务员所任职务没有条件、也不可能为公司谋利，则不应当产生任何瑕疵设立问题。其实，也就是说这种设立根本就谈不上什么瑕疵设立，是有效的。　


北安市人民法院 王胜宇
Chapter V
Guidelines for Interpretation
of the WTO Covered Agreements


OUTLINE

I Introduction
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
IV The Status of Legitimate Expectations in Interpretation



I Introduction
According to Art. 11 of the DSU, the panel's role is to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. In the previous chapter, we have examined the general standard of review labeled as “an objective assessment” regarding “the facts of the case”; clearly, for panels to fulfil appropriately their functions as designated in Art. 11 of the DSU, it is also indiscerptible to make such an objective assessment of “the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. Therefore, the interpretation issue of the covered agreements arises. In this section, the author will scrutinize guidelines for interpretation applied under the WTO jurisprudence.
To resolve a particular dispute, before addressing the parties' arguments in detail, it is clearly necessary and appropriate to clarify the general issues concerning the interpretation of the relevant provisions and their application to the parties' claims. However, the complex nature of the covered agreements has given rise to difficulties in interpretation.
As noted previously, GATT/WTO jurisprudence should not be viewed in isolation from general principles developed in international law or most jurisdictions; and according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, panels are bound by the “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” in their examination of the covered agreements. A number of recent adopted reports have repeatedly referred, as interpretative guidelines, to “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” as embodied in the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’), especially in its Arts. 31, 32. It is in accordance with these rules of treaty interpretation that panels or the Appellate Body have frequently examined the WTO provisions at issue, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms of those provisions in their context, in the light of the object and purpose of the covered agreements and the WTO Agreement. These Vienna Convention articles provide as follows:

“Art. 31: General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Art. 32 Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”

II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
Pursuant to Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, the duty of a treaty interpreter is to determine the meaning of a term in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. As noted by the Appellate Body in its Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (DS8/DS10/DS11), “Article 31 of provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: ‘interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’. The provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions”. And in US ? Shrimps (DS58), the Appellate Body accordingly states: “A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.”
More specifically, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules that: “Text, context and object-and-purpose correspond to well established textual, systemic and teleological methodologies of treaty interpretation, all of which typically come into play when interpreting complex provisions in multilateral treaties. For pragmatic reasons the normal usage, and we will follow this usage, is to start the interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the ‘raw’ text of the relevant treaty provisions and then seek to construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. However, the elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object-and-purpose as well as good faith - are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Context and object-and-purpose may often appear simply to confirm an interpretation seemingly derived from the ‘raw’ text. In reality it is always some context, even if unstated, that determines which meaning is to be taken as ‘ordinary’ and frequently it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at object-and-purpose. As noted by the Appellate Body: ‘Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: 'interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty'’. It adds, however, that ‘[t]he provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions’.” 1
In sum, as noted by the Panel in Canada-Automotive Industry (DS139/DS142), “understanding of these rules of interpretation is that, even though the text of a term is the starting-point for any interpretation, the meaning of a term cannot be found exclusively in that text; in seeking the meaning of a term, we also have to take account of its context and to consider the text of the term in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention explicitly refers to the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their [the terms'] context and in the light of its [the treaty's] object and purpose’. The three elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object and purpose - are to be viewed as one integrated rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Of course, context and object and purpose may simply confirm the textual meaning of a term. In many cases, however, it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at the context and/or object and purpose”. 2
With regard to Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention, it is repeatedly ruled that, “[t]he application of these rules in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention will usually allow a treaty interpreter to establish the meaning of a term. However, if after applying Article 31 the meaning of the term remains ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, Article 32 allows a treaty interpreter to have recourse to ‘... supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’. With regard to 'the circumstances of [the] conclusion' of a treaty, this permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the historical background against which the treaty was negotiated.” 3
As a whole, under the WTO jurisprudence, with regard to the dispute among the parties over the appropriate legal analysis to be applied, as general principles or guidelines of interpretation, it is often begun with Art. 3.2 of the DSU. To go further, as noted by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, “the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ are those incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). GATT panels have previously interpreted the GATT in accordance with the VCLT. The Panel noted that Article 3:2 DSU in fact codifies this previously-established practice”. Consequently, “the Panel concluded that the starting point of an interpretation of an international treaty, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in accordance with Article 31 VCLT, is the wording of the treaty. The wording should be interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole and subsequent practice and agreements should be taken into account. Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation should be made exceptionally only under the conditions specified in Article 32 VCLT”. 4
In short, it is may be the case that, it is generally considered that the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation set out in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have attained the status of rules of customary international law. In recent years, the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body and WTO panels has become one of the richest sources from which to receive guidance on their application.
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
The Panel Report on Turkey-Textile and Clothing Products (DS34) states concerning the conflicts issue that: 5
“As a general principle, WTO obligations are cumulative and Members must comply with all of them at all times unless there is a formal ‘conflict’ between them. This flows from the fact that the WTO Agreement is a ‘Single Undertaking’. On the definition of conflict, it should be noted that: ‘… a conflict of law-making treaties arises only where simultaneous compliance with the obligations of different instruments is impossible. ... There is no conflict if the obligations of one instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those of another, or if it is possible to comply with the obligations of one instrument by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded by another’.
This principle, also referred to by Japan in its third party submission, is in conformity with the public international law presumption against conflicts which was applied by the Appellate Body in Canada - Periodicals and in EC - Bananas III, when dealing with potential overlapping coverage of GATT 1994 and GATS, and by the panel in Indonesia - Autos, in respect of the provisions of Article III of GATT, the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. In Guatemala - Cement, the Appellate Body when discussing the possibility of conflicts between the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the DSU, stated: ‘A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them’.
We recall the Panel's finding in Indonesia - Autos, a dispute where Indonesia was arguing that the measures under examination were subsidies and therefore the SCM Agreement being lex specialis, was the only ‘applicable law’ (to the exclusion of other WTO provisions): ‘14.28 In considering Indonesia's defence that there is a general conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and those of Article III of GATT, and consequently that the SCM Agreement is the only applicable law, we recall first that in public international law there is a presumption against conflict. This presumption is especially relevant in the WTO context since all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we recall the principle of effective interpretation pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements) must be given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of words.’
In light of this general principle, we will consider whether Article XXIV authorizes measures which Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC otherwise prohibit. In view of the presumption against conflicts, as recognized by panels and the Appellate Body, we bear in mind that to the extent possible, any interpretation of these provisions that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided.”
It is clearly implied by the ruling above that, in the WTO system, any interpretation of the covered agreements that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided. In this respect, as to WTO rules of conflicts, in the context that all WTO agreements were negotiated “at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum”, the principle of effective interpretation is recalled. What a principle is it?
As ruled by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverage (DS8/DS10/DS11), effective interpretation is a principle “whereby all provisions of a treaty must be, to the extent possible, given their full meaning so that parties to such a treaty can enforce their rights and obligations effectively…. this principle of interpretation prevents [the panel] from reaching a conclusion on the claims … or the defense …, or on the related provisions invoked by the parties, that would lead to a denial of either party's rights or obligations.” 6 This ruling is upheld by the Appellate Body when ruling that, “[a] fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). In United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that ‘[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.” 7